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Abstract In some criminal cases a forensic psychiatrist is
asked to make an assessment of the state of mind of the
defendant at the time of the legally relevant act. A con-
siderable number of people seem to hold that the basis for
this assessment is that free will is required for legal
responsibility, and that mental disorders can compromise
free will. In fact, because of the alleged relationship
between the forensic assessment and free will, researchers
in forensic psychiatry also consider the complicated
metaphysical discussions on free will relevant to the
assessment. At the same time, there is concern about the
lack of advancement with respect to clarifying the nature of
the forensic assessment. In this paper I argue that, even if
free will is considered relevant, there may be no need for
forensic researchers to engage into metaphysical discus-
sions on free will in order to make significant progress. I
will do so, drawing a parallel between the assessment of
criminal responsibility on the one hand, and the medical
practice of obtaining informed consent on the other. I argue
that also with respect to informed consent, free will is
considered relevant, or even crucial. This is the parallel.
Yet, researchers on informed consent have not entered into
metaphysical debates on free will. Meanwhile, research on
informed consent has made significant progress. Based on
the parallel with respect to free will, and the differences
with respect to research, I conclude that researchers on
forensic assessment may not have to engage into meta-
physical discussions on free will in order to advance our
understanding of this psychiatric practice.
Keywords Free will  Criminal responsibility 
Informed consent  Forensic psychiatry  Law
Introduction
In some criminal cases a forensic psychiatrist is asked to make
an assessment about the state of mind of the defendant at the
time of the legally relevant act. More precisely, the forensic
expert is asked to relate the state of mind to the legally relevant
act.1 Based on the assessment, a statement has to be made on
the legal accountability of the defendant.2 The results of such a
forensic assessment may have profound impact on the even-
tual verdict. Apparently, we are interested in the state of mind
of the defendant in terms of a mental disorder, and we turn out
to be willing to attach major legal consequences to the out-
come of a forensic psychiatric assessment.
Perhaps surprisingly, the conceptual basis for this psy-
chiatric assessment is unclear. We do not know what it is
exactly, that a mental disorder ‘does’ to render a person not
responsible for a specific act. Meanwhile, several rules for
the ‘insanity defense’ have been formulated, the most
influential being the M’Naghten Rule.3 The different rules
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1 In this paper I approach the assessment as a psychiatric practice, but
certainly also psychologists are involved in these assessments.
2 Some forensic experts are reluctant to make a specific statement on
what they consider to be the ‘ultimate question’ of legal accountability.
It has been argued that psychiatrists should not make the inference that
the person is actually responsible for the legally relevant act, or that this
statement should be phrased explicitly as an opinion (Gutheil 2005).
The ‘ultimate question’ should be answered, then, by judge or jury. I do
not intend to take a specific position in these matters. I will mainly refer
to ‘criminal responsibility’ because it is a term often attached to the type
of assessments discussed in this paper.
3 See Elliott 1996 for an overview of and a reflection on these rules
and the insanity defense.
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all have their advantages and shortcomings. None of them
grasps our intuitions concerning the ‘insanity defense’ to
full satisfaction (Elliott 1996).
Yet, a considerable number of people seem to hold that
the basis for the forensic assessment is that free will is
required for legal responsibility, and that mental disorders
can compromise free will. As Reich (2005) puts it: ‘‘The
law recognizes that insanity compromises free will, and
classifies someone without free will as legally not
responsible for his or her actions.’’4 The forensic psychi-
atrist’s task, then, is to assess whether the legally relevant
act was performed ‘freely’, or that, alternatively, a mental
disorder decisively influenced the process leading up to the
act. The fact that free will is considered central also
explains why psychiatrists in their actual testimonies
before the court sometimes use phrases like ‘‘the defendant
is not accountable for the act because she did not perform it
freely, but due to a paranoid delusion’’ (Morse 2007). In
fact, because of the alleged relationship between the
forensic assessment and free will, researchers on forensic
assessment have considered the complicated metaphysical
discussions on free will relevant to the assessment (Stone
2008; Luthe and Ro¨sler 2004; see Morse 2007 for a
critique).
In this paper I will develop an argument showing that
researchers on forensic assessment may not have to engage
in metaphysical discussions on free will, even if free will is
considered relevant to forensic assessment. I will do so,
drawing a parallel between the assessment of criminal
responsibility on the one hand, and the medical practice of
obtaining informed consent on the other. I argue that also
with respect to informed consent, free will is considered
relevant.5 Yet, researchers on informed consent, unlike
researchers on criminal responsibility, have not engaged in
metaphysical debates on free will.6 Meanwhile, significant
progress has been achieved in research on informed con-
sent (see ‘‘A parallel: informed consent’’). I argue that
research on informed consent could provide a helpful
model for research on forensic assessment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next
section I will briefly present the philosophical debate on
free will. In section ‘‘Forensic assessment and free will’’, I
will discuss the impact of the philosophical worries on
forensic psychiatry. In section ‘‘A parallel: informed con-
sent’’, a parallel will be drawn with (research on) informed
consent. In sections ‘‘Potential of the parallel’’ and
‘‘Empirical ethics’’ I will explore the potential of this
parallel for forensic psychiatry.
The metaphysics of free will
In this section I will briefly present the complicated
philosophical issues concerning free will.7 The purpose of
this section is to show that, indeed, there is a serious
philosophical free will problem.
To start with, there is no consensus among philosophers
on how to define free will. Walter (2001) distinguishes
three main aspects or components of free will in the present
philosophical debate. The first component is, that to be free
one must be able to do otherwise. Second, to be free means
to act or choose for an understandable reason. And, third,
freedom requires that one is the originator of one’s actions.
A large part of the current philosophical discussion on free
will is concerned with the question to what extent these
three aspects really are essential to the concept of free will
(Walter 2001) For instance, many philosophers currently
believe that having alternative possibilities is in fact not a
requirement for free will or moral responsibility (Widerker
and McKenna 2003; Kane 2002). In this paper I will not
take a specific position on how to understand free will. The
philosophical unclarity about its definition is a fact, and the
paper is about dealing with the unclarity in forensic psy-
chiatry, not trying to solve it philosophically (see also
Meynen 2009a).8
Although there are profound problems attached to
defining free will, another problem appears to be even more
pressing. For philosophers have not been able to figure out
whether or not free will is compatible with a deterministic
world (Kane 2002; Searle 2007). Determinism is, briefly,
4 See also Sect. 3.
5 See Sect. 4 for examples.
6 It is hard to prove the absence of something, but it is safe to say that
while the metaphysical issues surrounding free will constitute a well
known (notorious) topic with respect to criminal responsibility in
forensic psychiatry (see also Sect. 3), this is not the case with respect
to informed consent.
7 In this paper I will refer to the philosophy of free will mostly as
‘metaphysics’. Meanwhile, free will is often approached from the
perspective of responsibility (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001; Kane 2002).
More precisely, while the compatibility between free will and
determinism might be considered a strictly metaphysical issue,
establishing the requirements for moral responsibility can be consid-
ered a ‘metaethical’ or ‘ethical’ concern. In practice, however, in the
discussion on free will, metaphysics and (meta)ethics have become
intertwined to a large extent (see, e.g., The Oxford Handbook of Free
will by Kane 2002; Pereboom 2001). For instance, the issue whether
we can be held responsible for a choice while we did not have
alternative possibilities, can be perceived as a (meta)ethical question,
but it can also be crucial in the metaphysical debate on the
compatibility between free will and determinism.
8 In philosophical discussions on free will, free will is often used as
synonymous with ‘freedom’, and sometimes with acting ‘freely’
(Kane 2002). In line with this use of the words, I will consider
‘freedom’ as referring to ‘free will’, both in philosophical literature
and in the literature on criminal responsibility and informed consent.
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the thesis that whatever happens is inevitable or necessary,
either by fate, or by the will of God, or by the laws of nature
(Kane 1998, 2002). Some believe that the everyday world in
which we live is governed by deterministic natural laws
(Kane 1998). Philosophers have not been able to establish
whether in such a world free will can actually exist. And the
discussion on the possible existence of free will is not only
waged among philosophers, also (neuro)scientists are par-
ticipating in the debate (Kawohl and Habermeyer 2007;
Walter 2001; Kane 2002; Gazzaniga 2005). In addition, we
have to note that not only determinism, but also indeter-
minism appears to be problematic for free will. For what
room would be left for free will, if everything happened by
chance? (Kane 2002) But this issue, somehow, is less
prominent in the philosophical debate (Kane 2002).
In general, there are three main philosophical positions
on the compatibility of freedom and determinism: com-
patibilism, hard determinism and libertarianism (Kane
2002). Briefly, hard determinists not only hold that free
will and determinism are incompatible, they also consider
determinism true, and, therefore, they deny free will. All
events relate to each other like billiard ball collisions.
Libertarians have the opposite view. Although they agree
that freedom and determinism are incompatible, they
affirm free will, and, therefore, consider determinism false.
The deterministic chain of events is broken, at least at some
points in time, they say. Compatibilism, the most popular
position, holds that even in a deterministic world there can
still be significant freedom—free will ‘‘worth wanting’’, as
Dennett puts it (Dennett 2003). These three philosophical
positions have basically existed for centuries. To the phi-
losopher Searle (2007) the persistence of the problem of
free will seems ‘something of a scandal’ (Searle 2007),
because no substantial progress on this problem has been
made. And, on Searles account (2007), no solution is in
sight: ‘‘The problem of free will is unusual among con-
temporary philosophical issues in that we are nowhere
remotely near having a solution’’ (see also Meynen 2009a).
As it appears, psychiatrists cannot expect philosophers
to provide them with a solution anytime soon.
Forensic assessment and free will
Given this state of affairs it may be understandable that
people feel uncomfortable when forensic assessment is
understood in terms of ‘free will’. For instance, when Stone
in a paper on forensic psychiatry says about the issue of
‘‘determinism v. free will’’ that it is ‘‘relevant to every
question of volition and responsibility’’ (Stone 2008).
Forensic practitioners also may feel uncomfortable when
Kawohl and Habermeyer (2007) write that ‘‘the psychiatrist
as an expert witness is forced to find a practical way to deal
with the existence of the critical term free will’’.9 Since
philosophers do not agree on what free will is, and whether
it exists, this engagement in philosophical discussions
could even undermine the reliability of the forensic
assessment. Yet, not all forensic experts and theorists are
convinced that free will is central. For instance, Morse
(2007) has argued, aware of the metaphysical complexities
surrounding free will, that it is confused to consider free
will vital or even relevant to forensic assessment. For no
legal doctrine or legal document (in the USA) explicitly
mentions that free will is implicated. And, in order to avoid
confusion, the best thing forensic psychiatrists can do is to
stop thinking about free will.10 It is safe to say that at this
moment there is no consensus on the relevance of (the
metaphysics of) free will to the forensic assessment. We
could, of course, try to device a conclusive argument either
showing its relevance or its irrelevance. Yet, this is not my
approach in this paper. I will propose a way to deal with
‘free will’ in forensic psychiatry in the absence of such a
conclusive argument or consensus.11
In the remainder of the paper I will try to show that even
if free will is considered relevant, forensic experts and
researchers do not necessarily have to feel obliged to
engage in metaphysical discussions in order to clarify the
nature of the assessment. In the next section I will link
assessments of criminal responsibility to the practice of
obtaining informed consent. Via this link, I will arrive at a
suggestion how to deal with the issue of ‘free will’ in
forensic psychiatry.
A parallel: informed consent
The attention paid by forensic theorists to philosophical
arguments on free will might have seemed ‘logical’
because of the widely shared intuition that assessments of
9 Cf. Barendregt et al. 2008, Dressing 2007, and Alper 1998. See also
Van Marle (2000), explaning the practice of forensic assessments in
the Netherlands: ‘‘Undiminished responsibility means that the person
concerned had complete access to his or her free will at the time of the
crime with which he or she is charged and could therefore have
chosen not to do it. Irresponsibility means that the person concerned
had no free will at all with which to choose at the time of the crime
with which he or she is charged. Important here is determining the
moment when aspects of the disorder become manifest in the situation
(‘‘the scene of the crime’’) that will eventually lead to the
perpetration. The earlier they play a role, the more inevitable will
be the (disastrous) sequence of events, and the stronger will be the
eventual limitation of free will.’’
10 Meynen (2009a) has argued that Morse’s argument is not
conclusive.
11 I do not claim that free will is required for criminal responsibility,
or that it is by compromising free will that mental disorder can
suspend criminal responsibility.
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criminal responsibility have to do with ‘free will’. Yet,
from another angle it may seem remarkable that meta-
physical concerns have so deeply penetrated the discus-
sions on forensic assessments. In fact, freedom is not only
considered to be involved in forensic assessment of legal
accountability, but also in another medical practice: the
‘everyday’ medical practice of obtaining informed consent
to treatment. Still, although also this practice is considered
to be related to free will (see below), attempts to elucidate
this practice have not led to engagements into the slippery
metaphysics of free will.
I will give a few examples of ‘free will’ or ‘free choice’
in literature on informed consent. As Simon (2005) puts it,
rational decision making about treatment occurs when a
patient’s consent to treatment ‘‘reflects’’ that patient’s
‘‘freedom of choice’’. According to Welie and Welie
(2001), patients can only be considered competent and
responsible for the decisions on treatment they make, if
they were ‘‘free and able to reach a different decision’’.
Paterick et al. (2008) state that, ‘‘to give valid informed
consent, the patient must be competent and the patient’s
actions must be voluntary. Voluntary means ‘‘of free mind
and free will.’’ And Pinals and Appelbaum (2002, p. 479)
write that: ‘‘Generally, informed consent, whether to
research or treatment, is broken down into three parts:
voluntariness, disclosure, and competence. Voluntariness
implies that research subjects must be acting of their own
free will when they agree to participate in research.’’
Finally, Roberts (2002) emphasizes the importance of
voluntarism, which she defines as ‘‘ideally encompassing
the individual’s ability to act in accordance with one’s
authentic sense of what is good, right, and best in light of
one’s situation, values, and prior history. Voluntarism
involves the capacity to make this choice freely and in the
absence of coercion.’’ In other words, notions of ‘‘free
will’’ and ‘‘free choice’’ are considered tightly connected to
(the concept of) informed consent.12
Since the concept of freedom is present in conceptual
reflections on obtaining informed consent, also this medical
practice is, in principle, not immune to philosophical dis-
cussions on free will. For instance, we could ask ourselves:
could a patient make a ‘free’ decision about treatment—
and therefore give genuine informed consent—in a deter-
ministic world? This question has a comparable form as the
question: can we ascribe accountability to a person in a
deterministic world? Yet, this type of questions has not
really troubled researchers on informed consent.
I do not claim that all the senses in which ‘free will’ and
‘freedom’ or ‘free choice’ feature in the debates on
assessments criminal responsibility and informed consent
are identical. This would require detailed arguments. Yet, it
seems clear that matters of ‘freedom’, ‘free will’, and ‘free
action/choice’ are present in literature on both practices.
Meanwhile, the literature on informed consent has, basi-
cally, not engaged into metaphysical discussions on free
will. This shows that, apparently, even if matters of free-
dom are considered relevant, one is still free to decide (not)
to engage into metaphysical discussions.
In principle, it could be that the metaphysics of free will
have not penetrated discussions on competence because
nobody is interested in the conceptual background of this
assessment.13 But this is, certainly, not the case. Many
efforts have been undertaken to achieve conceptual and
operational clarification with respect to informed consent
(Appelbaum 2007; Welie 2001). As a result of these
efforts, it has been possible to propose specific criteria, like
the criteria for competence to consent to treatment (Ap-
pelbaum 2007). In addition, scales have been developed to
assist physicians in examining a person’s competence to
consent to treatment, especially the MacArthur (MacCAT)
scale (Grisso et al. 1997). Surely, there remains unclarity
about the criteria for competence, and there is at present no
‘gold standard’ that tells a physician what competence is
(Appelbaum 2007; Spike 2008). Yet, using the criteria and
using the MacArthur scale valuable clinical data have been
obtained (see, e.g., Owen 2008). Although the MacCAT
scale may be the most widely used in research on informed
consent (Jeste et al. 2006), it is not known exactly to what
extent in everyday clinical practice this tool or the Ap-
pelbaum (2007) criteria are being used. In this respect it
might also be noteworthy that, as Welie observed (2008, p.
87) in an empirical study on competence in a relevant
health care setting, ‘‘the issue of patient decision-making
competence was not a topic of debate or discussion at all
among the observed health care professionals.’’
Meanwhile, with respect to the forensic assessment it
has turned out to be difficult to achieve such conceptual
and practical progress, and there are concerns about the
lack of clarity of the assessment (Murrie and Warren 2005;
Barendregt et al. 2008; Rogers and Shuman 2005;
Henderson 2005). In part, forensic efforts for conceptual
elucidation have been absorbed by discussions on (the
12 Other examples can be found in Rosenfeld (2002), Palmer and
Kaufman (2003), Thomasmaa (2000), and Yank et al. (2002).
Interestingly, Elliott (1991) even proposed to conceive of competence
to consent to treatment in terms of accountability. He argued that, in
essence, what we want from patients when they make their decisions
on medical treatment, is that they can be justifiably be held
accountable for these decisions. So, his analysis brings him to exactly
the same concept that is considered central in forensic assessment of
criminal responsibility – the very concept that brought free will deep
into forensic theorizing. 13 I will not explore why it is that this has not happened.
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relevance of philosophical worries on) free will (Morse
2007; Felthous 2008).14
In conclusion, there is a significant parallel between the
two medical practices: both are considered to be related to
notions of ‘freedom’, ‘free will’, or ‘choosing or acting
freely’.15 Meanwhile, there is a significant difference with
respect to the extent to which research on these practices
has been absorbed by metaphysical concerns about free
will (and determinism). In addition, there is a difference
with respect to the level of conceptual and practical elu-
cidation that has been achieved in both practices.16
In the next section, I will explore what could be con-
sidered to be the ‘potential’ of the parallel.
Potential of the parallel
As it appears, in research on informed consent it has been
possible to work effectively on conceptual and operational
clarification, without either denying the relevance of free-
dom to informed consent, or adopting an explicit meta-
physical stance on the compatibility of freedom and
determinism.17 If we translate this to the forensic assess-
ment, we could argue that even if freedom is considered to
be involved in the forensic assessment, (the metaphysical
problem of) freedom does not have to be approached
‘head-on’ in order to achieve certain conceptual and
operational elucidation of this assessment. In other words,
forensic psychiatry may not need to adopt a specific stance
on the metaphysical issue of free will and its relevance to
the assessment. Surely, solving the metaphysical problems
could be of (great) help, but as it appears, this could take a
while. Based on the parallel, I am pointing to the possibility
that some relevant progress can be achieved with respect to
the psychiatric assessment, even if ‘free will’ is not
(philosophically) addressed.18 In my view, this practical
argument could be helpful in deciding how to deal with the
issue of free will in forensic research.
Certainly, there are also relevant differences between
forensic assessment and assessments of competence (for an
exploration of differences and similarities between these
assessments see Meynen 2009b). These are for a large part
related to the fact that while forensic assessments are
performed in a juridical environment and related to an
offence, assessments of competence are performed in a
medical environment related to choosing a treatment
option. Therefore, also the consequences of the assessment
may differ: punishment (in case of forensic assessment)
and treatment (in case of assessments of competence). In
addition, due to the nature of forensic assessment, in which
the court has to be informed, in forensic assessment there is
not the kind of confidentiality which exists in the normal
doctor patient relationship (Gutheil 2005). However, both
are medical assessments—in which psychiatrists are often
considered experts—on capacities of a person which are
considered to be related to ‘free will’, ‘free action’ and
‘free choice’. This is the similarity or parallel I want to
bring forward in this paper.
Based on these considerations, I argue, forensic
researchers could justify avoiding the philosophical issue
of free will. This is not because the matter would be
irrelevant, or because the metaphysical problems would
have been solved, but because research on a medical
practice which is considered to be related to free will,
apparently does not have to deal with free will head-on in
order to achieve relevant progress. My suggestion does not
require that we consider free will irrelevant in the forensic
assessment. Yet, we do not have to feel forced into a
possibly fruitless metaphysical discussion on free will in
order to achieve some clarification of the forensic
assessment.
Still, I do feel that there is something more to be learnt
from research on informed consent.19 For I have approa-
ched this kind of research mainly in a negative way:
looking at what it has not been doing (getting into meta-
physical debates on free will). But what type of research
has been performed?
Empirical ethics
Much of the research on informed consent can be charac-
terized by an ‘empirical ethics approach’ (Candilis et al.
2008). Perhaps, this type of research, which I will briefly
discuss in this section, could also be helpful to forensic
psychiatry.20
14 I certainly do not mean to dismiss the efforts that have been
undertaken (see Rogers and Shuman 2005).
15 Not by everyone, but still by a considerable number of researchers
(I am not claiming that they are right or that they are wrong).
16 This will, of course, also have to do with the fact that many more
people are involved in research on informed consent.
17 See also Grubin 2008.
18 I am not claiming that full understanding can be achieved without
philosophical considerations.
19 On the other hand, one could argue that research on informed
consent has ignored the philosophical views of free will on. But this is
not the point I make in this paper.
20 See also Meynen 2009b and c. For discussions on the practice and
conceptual underpinnings of empirical ethics in psychiatry, see, e.g.,
Eastman and Starling 2006, Widdershoven et al. 2009, McMillan and
Hope 2008. A central issue with respect to empirical ethics in general
is the question: How can empirical data give rise to normative
conclusions?, which comes down to the ‘‘is—ought gap’’, as
discussed by, e.g., Van der Scheer and Widdershoven (2004).
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Empirical ethics may take many forms (Eastman and
Starling 2006; Widdershoven et al. 2008). In general, it
aims, alongside ethical theorizing, to obtain specific qual-
itative empirical data. It can do so via different methods:
observations, interviews questionnaires, etc. (Widdersho-
ven et al 2008). Empirical ethics has been a helpful
approach to many complicated, normative medical issues,
like questions about end-of life decisions, and also com-
petence and informed consent (Widdershoven et al. 2008;
Eastman and Starling 2006). In my view, the assessment of
criminal responsibility has comparable features: being
complicated, normative, and medical in nature.21
One approach in empirical medical ethics, so called
stakeholder dialogue, tries to unite different stakeholders
around a conceptual or normative issue. In this type of
study, as Widdershoven et al. (2009) point out, it is
essential that ‘‘data are gathered, not about participants in
practice, but together with practitioners (…).’’ Via such a
dialogue, in which several stakeholder groups participate
around a (complicated) normative topic, mutual under-
standing between different stakeholder groups can also be
enhanced (Widdershoven et al. 2009). Especially because
of the profoundly interdisciplinary terrain of forensic psy-
chiatry, it is important that the method used can lead to an
outcome that is likely to be both relevant and acceptable to
the different parties involved.22 This could be a reason to
consider stakeholder dialogue. Stakeholders with respect to
assessments of criminal responsibility are, among others,
judges, lawyers and psychiatrists. An important character-
istic of empirical (medical) ethics in general is that it is
familiar with research at the interface of medicine and law
(Eastman and Starling 2006).
The question can be raised whether, given certain sim-
ilarities between the assessments of competence and
criminal responsibility (see also Meynen 2009b), there
could be a direct translation of the criteria for informed
consent to the context of forensic assessments. I do not
want to exclude this possibility, yet, for instance concern-
ing the Appelbaum criteria, each of them should be con-
sidered carefully with respect to the (practical) relevance
and helpfulness in forensic settings. I rather suggest to
consider the methods of empirical ethics in general as
potentially helpful, than to propose a direct translation of,
e.g., the MacCAT (see also Hondius 2009).
Recent research that, perhaps, could also be valuable
within the framework of ‘empirical ethics’, is the approach
by Barendregt et al. (2008).23 They studied empirically the
factors on which forensic experts actually base their
judgements concerning criminal responsibility. They
motivate their approach saying that many papers address-
ing criminal responsibility focus on what ‘‘forensic experts
ought to include in evaluating a defendant’s criminal
responsibility’’, but that in spite of these papers there is
‘‘hardly any consensus on what constitutes grounds for
(diminished) responsibility’’. Barendregt et al. (2008)
found that experts’ judgements were not only based on the
presence or absence of mental disorders, but also, e.g., on
cultural and crime related characteristics, like the weapon
used, or whether the act was committed alone or with
others. Also from this type of research indications may be
obtained for further elucidation of forensic assessment.
Meanwhile, such research should not result in direct con-
sequences for forensic assessment. It could rather deliver
relevant new input data for the debate/dialogue among
stakeholders about what it is that forensic assessment has to
focus on. Still, surely, the factors that actually play a role in
the assessment are not necessarily the factors that should
play a role in the assessment.24 Yet, my proposal is not
meant to eliminate all possible (conceptual) problems, but
to argue for using an approach to clarifying the forensic
assessment that has been effective in research on informed
consent. This is an argument, then, derived from practical
observation, namely that an empirical ethics approach is
considered to have delivered relevant results with respect
to informed consent (Candilis et al. 2008), rather than an
argument derived from a conceptual justification of
empirical ethics. Based on this observation, I suggest that
empirical ethics may be a candidate for dealing with a
fundamentally interdisciplinary issue (law, medicine) like
forensic assessment.
In this paper, I do not intend to bring forward that
engaging into philosophical reflections on free will is
pointless with respect to forensic assessments. Yet, the
complexities of certain philosophical issues could result in
some sort of stalemate. We should try to avoid that efforts
to elucidate the nature of the forensic assessment get stuck
in the metaphysics of free will. Forensic researchers should
feel free (not) to engage in philosophical debates, as long
as that seems to be fruitful (Meynen 2009a).
21 The topic in fact deserves a more elaborate argument, but within
the framework of this paper I will restrict myself to some more
general remarks.
22 See Widdershoven et al. (2009) for a discussion on stakeholder
dialogue, also with respect to the integration of empirical data, and
the role of the ethicist in this process (also as related to so called
responsive evaluation).
23 See also Meynen 2009c. Meanwhile, the research itself is not an
‘empirical ethics approach’.
24 See also Van der Scheer and Widdershoven (2004). The question
might even arise whether empirical research could either directly or
indirectly tell us more about the metaphysics of ‘free will’, in other
words, whether ‘empirical metaphysics’ is possible, but addressing
this question lies outside the scope of this paper.
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Conclusion
Forensic psychiatric assessment is not the only medical
practice in which free will has been considered to be
central. I argued that there is a parallel with the practice of
obtaining informed consent. For also with respect to
informed consent issues of ‘free will’ and ‘free choice’ are
considered relevant or even central. Yet, there is a signif-
icant difference as well: researchers on informed consent
have not engaged in metaphysical discussions on free will.
Meanwhile, research on informed consent shows that rel-
evant conceptual and operational clarification can be
achieved, even if one does not engage in these debates. In
fact, in research on informed consent, neither the
involvement of free will has been denied, nor, for instance,
the compatibility problem addressed. I suggest that, in this
respect, research on informed consent could provide a
helpful model for research on forensic assessment. In my
view, especially given the persistent unclarity in forensic
psychiatry, it is important to have a model for further
research that is both feasible and potentially effective.
More specifically, empirical ethics, as used in research on
informed consent, might be a candidate approach to
studying the assessment of legal accountability. Especially
its interdisciplinary nature and its familiarity with the
interface of medicine and the law seem to be valuable
characteristics.
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